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RULE

OF

LEGAL RHETORIC

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*

T

HESE essays are dedicated to Dean Attanasio, who has long
championed the Rule of Law. I too have championed the rule of
law. Indeed, I have practiced it by participating in many rule-making enterprises—the American Law Institute’s Restatements, for example, and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for another example.1 I still believe in the rule of law. But I have
doubts about whether we fully understand the American version of that
concept.
The doubts arise from various circumstances:
Many Americans regularly disregard some of our laws, notably the
posted speed limits. On any highway marked at 60 mph, most cars will be
going about 67–70 mph. Everyone knows this, but we do not take action
to raise the speed limits or to eliminate them, as the Europeans have
done on their freeways.2 It must be convenient to have both a definite
rule and an indefinite enforcement policy, perhaps convenient for most
drivers and for the highway police.
Many Americans regularly cheat a little bit on their income tax returns,
and some cheat a lot. One solution would be to eliminate income tax on
incomes below $100,000, as Michael Graetz has suggested.3 Another solution would be to increase the staff of the Internal Revenue Service, but
that agency is very unpopular, particularly these days.4
Many business enterprises regard “compliance” with legal regulation as
a strategy of marginal observance, based on estimation of the risk of being caught.5 The strategy is rational because the formal network of regulation of many businesses, if taken literally, would be very burdensome
for many enterprises.6 Many governments have a “counter-compliance”
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strategy.7 Under this strategy, the regulations are drafted as over-regulation to counter the discount on typical compliance.8 Nominal over-regulation coupled with minimalist compliance yields a zone for negotiation.9
Most litigation is settled rather than adjudicated.10 That has always
been the case, but these days it is dramatically so. The settlement ratio in
most tribunals is 90% or more of case filings.11 Many appellate courts
have systematic procedures aimed at promoting settlements even at the
filing stage.12
The watchphrase in most legal disputation therefore is “bargaining in
the shadow of the law.” That is the title of a now-famous article written
several decades ago.13 The article specifically addressed divorce litigation,
but its thesis is now valid across the legal landscape.14
Our legal system has become extremely difficult to understand for ordinary citizens, even for smart lawyers. The following is a brief outline of
some of the causes of its complexity.
I. “TOO MANY CASES MAKE BAD LAW”
Some years ago, Professor David Luban described our situation in
terms of the sheer volume of legal disputes:
America is getting bigger. . . . The number of possible interactions
increase much more rapidly than the number of actors . . . . Increasing population density, coupled with technological advances in communication, means that the average daily number of interactions per
person is undoubtedly increasing. . . . [T]he percentage of interactions that go sour will rise. . . . [M]ore trial courts generate more law,
along with more inconsistent decisions, more appeals, more efforts
by higher courts to reconcile inconsistencies—[a] buzzing blooming
confusion of legal information. . . . Too many cases make bad law.15
More briefly, the Judicial Conference of the United States put it this way:
“Federal law would be a babel.”16
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1171.
9. See id.
10. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation and Settlement, in HARV. L. SCH.
JOHN M. OLINE CTR. FOR L., ECON. & BUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, available at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/218.pdf.
11. See id.
12. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS, 3 (2d ed. 2006).
13. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
14. See id.
15. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO L. J. 2619,
2642–46 (1995); see also Michael Moffitt, Three Things to be Against (“Settlement” Not
Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203 (2009).
16. COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS. 19 (1995).
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II. AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY
Since American courts are relatively activists in redefining the law, in
every case lies the possibility that the law will be changed from what it
was when the case began. Trial judges in our system reflect a diversity in
political philosophy that expresses the largely political basis of their appointment as judges. In most other legal systems, the judges are appointed primarily according to traditional professional criteria, and thus
are comparatively homogenous in outlook.17 There has been much comment recently on the activism of the present Supreme Court of the
United States. Careful empirical studies support this observation18. However, it should also be remembered that the Supreme Court in the past
has been very activist in other directions. The most dramatic example is
Brown v. Board of Education,19 a decision we have come to see as entirely appropriate but which at the time was revolutionary.
III. INATTENTION TO SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
Our governmental units are preoccupied with maintaining the status
quo and creating new reforms. As a consequence of these preoccupations, they give inadequate attention to clearing up confusion in the system as it exists at any given time. There are many examples: the gross
underfunding of most public pension programs;20 agencies of the same
government using different telephonic and electronic communication systems, which in the case of the 9/11 catastrophe in New York meant that
police and fire teams could not communicate with each other,21 and in
the case of the new Affordable Care Act, it has been extraordinarily difficult to coordinate communication among various federal government
agencies;22 most major construction projects, public or private, face prolonged delays because they must comply separately with uncoordinated
directives from diverse regulatory authorities;23 a famous one, now finally
corrected, was that each of the U.S. armed forces participated in combat
without a single coordinating commander.24
An important lack of coordination has long existed in the relationship
between background, state law, and adoption of new federal legislation
17. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA BASSETT, CIVIL PROCE591–92 (6th ed. 2011).
18. Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court is No
Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161 (2011).
19. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnt’y, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNDERFUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSION
PLANS (2011).
21. THE 911 COMMISSION, THE 911 COMMISSION REPORT, at 280–85 (2004).
22. See DENVER DEP’T HUMAN SERV., DENVER DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
COMMUNITY SERVICES GRANT NEEDS ASSESSMENT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2014).
23. Christopher J. Mayer & C. Tsunel Somerville, Land Use Regulation and New Construction, available at https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/519/
519.pdf.
24. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (creating the
Joint Chiefs of Staff).
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and regulation. The legal aspect of this situation is called the preemption
problem: To what extent, if any, does federal regulation of a subject imply
that existing state regulation is preempted, that is, displaced partially or
entirely? This complicated problem is the subject of an entire book by
Alan Untereiner, The Preemption Defense in Torts Actions.25 I made a
contribution to this discussion in Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown
in Our Constitutional System.26
IV. AN UNUSUALLY COMPLEX LEGAL SYSTEM
It is well recognized that our government system is a federation. A federation involves dual sovereignty—the national government and the State
governments.27 But our federation is even more complicated. There are
substantial differences among the States concerning appropriate public
policy in such matters as abortion and same-sex marriage, but also in supposedly more “neutral” issues such as taxation and health care.28 Accepted public policy in Massachusetts or California is virtually anathema
in regions such as Texas and Oklahoma, for example.
But there is even greater complexity than generally recognized. In our
system there are fifty states but approximately 3,000 counties, and much
of our public and legal policy is administered and shaped at the county
level.29 For example, basic public education is provided by local government, as is the basic police function and the administration of justice in
the trial courts. Housing and zoning also are largely under local control.
Many important private activities are similarly situated—churches, civic
associations, residential areas, and so on. Congressman Tip O’Neill famously said that “all politics is local.”30
Additional dimensions of complexity result from the separation of
powers at both the national and state level. The legislatures can enact but
they cannot enforce, and the executive can shape public policy by selective enforcement. The complexities in local government can defy explanation. And judicial authority stands ready, and sometimes receptive, to
nullify through judicial review what the other branches and units of government have sought to implement.
V. AN “UNRULY” CITIZENRY
In the United States, law plays an ambiguous role in maintaining the
social order. Americans seem to have strong motivation to assert legal rights for themselves, but not so ready an inclination voluntarily
25. ALAN UNTEREINER, THE PREEMPTION DEFENCE IN TORT ACTIONS (2008).
26. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown in Our Constitutional System, 84 TULANE L. REV. 1143 (2010).
27. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Federalism:
Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 697 (2005–2006).
28. See id.
29. Overview of County Government, NAT’L ASS’N COUNTIES (2014), http://www.naco
.org/counties/learn/pages/overview.aspx.
30. CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS, TIP AND THE GIPPER (2013).
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to recognize legal authority. Adjustment of social conflict through
claiming and contesting of legal rights plays a very important part in
our political culture. . . . The American ethos is hostile to authority as
such. Efficiently implementing this set of values would require a peculiar system of social justice. The system would have to be wide
open to the reception of legal claims and hospitable to giving them
elaborate consideration. The system would be slow to impose final
judgment. It would permit social conflict to be articulated in terms of
legal rights but prefer that these conflicts ordinarily be resolved by
private bargain.31
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we might better think of our system as the
Rule of Legal Rhetoric: political pushing and shoving, conducted in legal
terminology, typically addressed through negotiation, ending in quasipublic resolutions—a complicated combination of multiple public authorities and decentralized private initiatives.
Our system is so complex that the arguably determinative rules overlap, qualify, and sometimes contradict each other, often in complex ways.
So counsel for parties often cannot confidently state that the governing
rule is X, only that the governing rule ought to be X but might be X or Y.
Also, there are often conflicting views of what the facts are, even after
discovery is complete, and different facts are the basis for different applicable rules of law. When that is so, as it often is, the rival contentions frame a problem of negotiation, conducted in the language of rule
of law but with both sides coming to recognize that neither has preemptive authority for its position.

31. HAZARD, LEUBSDORF

AND

BASSETT, supra note 17, at 601–03.

